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The authors in this issue of Health Ethics Today
work in a wide variety of health related settings 
involving a broad scope of clinical practice and 
multiple disciplines. The need for ethical refl ec-
tion in these various situations attests to ethics 
being an integral part of everyday work in health 
care. Ethics education has focused on teaching 
health care students and providers the necessary 
knowledge and skills to deal with complex and 
often esoteric patient related moral problems. 
While this is important, it is being increasingly 
recognized that the day to day work of health 
care providers involves many ordinary ethical di-
lemmas for which they have not been adequately 
prepared. 
At the level of the single institution, the innova-
tive development of the Royal Alexandra Hospi-
tal ethics internship is a good example of bring-
ing the philosopher ‘ethics expert’ into the living 
world of clinical ethics. Likewise, Connolly and 
Chidwick (2005) have described another Cana-
dian clinical ethics internship that provides op-
portunities to gain clinical ethics experience for 
upcoming ethicists. Frank (2004) suggests that we 
should think about ethics as an active relational 
process, think of it as “ethicsing”, rather than an 
inert or passive substantive. 
The papers by Blyth and Ryll, and Bailey and 
Russell are examples of active, relationally 
focused ethics dealing with care providers and 
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patients/clients. A shared model of decision–mak-
ing, based on a mutually respectful conception 
of this relationship, is being taught to students in 
health sciences curricula. The future should bring 
interdisciplinary education in ethics to students in 
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2Five years ago, clinicians and ethics committee mem-
bers at the Royal Alexandra Hospital (RAH), with 
fi nancial support from the hospital’s foundation, 
established a residency program in clinical ethics. 
The purpose of this year-long program is to bridge 
the divide between the academic and clinical worlds 
by providing individuals with academic training in 
bioethics the opportunity to apply theory learned in 
the classroom to real-life clinical situations. Through 
a variety of activities, including attending weekly 
unit meetings with members of the multi-disciplinary 
team (e.g., physicians, nurses, physiotherapists, occu-
pational therapists, social workers, dieticians, phar-
macists, etc.), shadowing health care team members 
to learn about their roles, serving on the hospital 
ethics committee, working alongside the hospital’s 
ethicist, and engaging in ethics consultations, the 
resident gains an appreciation for the realities of an 
acute care teaching hospital and learns about the 
role of the clinical ethicist in that setting. 
As the 2004 ethics resident at the RAH, I appreci-
ated the wisdom behind the decision to create the 
residency program. As described by Polanyi (1962) 
and explored by Benner (1984), there is a differ-
ence between having a theoretical understanding of 
something, or knowing “that”, and having practical 
knowledge about how something is done, or know-
ing “how”. Reading about how to drive a car is quite 
different from actually getting behind the wheel and 
driving one. To use an example from the fi eld of 
bioethics, reading about the process of ethics consul-
tation will provide you with theoretical knowledge, 
but practical knowledge of the process can only be 
gained through engaging in consultations. It is in 
the clinical setting that one comes to understand 
the complexity of ethical issues and the intensity of 
emotions at the bedside or in a family conference.  
The cases brought to the attention of the Ethics 
Service at our hospital are rarely simple or straight-
forward. These situations not uncommonly involve 
a patient with questionable decision-making capac-
ity and a level of uncertainty regarding the patient’s 
prognosis, the patient’s wishes, or the “good” in 
the situation. In some instances, there may also 
be an element of disagreement present as to how 
best to proceed. Imagine being asked by the health 
care team for assistance in working with an elderly 
woman who can no longer express her wishes as a 
result of dementia. The attending physician has sug-
gested that the patient would benefi t from a surgical 
procedure, but there are clear risks associated with 
the procedure. Family members have considered 
the options and disagree among themselves about 
whether or not to proceed with the surgery. It is one 
thing to puzzle over how one might theoretically 
proceed in this type of situation, quite another to 
meet with the people involved individually and listen 
to their stories, and then, as appropriate, to bring 
everyone together as a group to discuss the issue at 
hand. Skills are required to facilitate the process of 
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Medicine, Nursing, Pharmacy, other health science 
disciplines and Law, beginning at the undergraduate 
stage of the students’ professional development.
Schrecker’s paper reminds us how important ‘up-
stream’ decisions involving resource allocation can 
have profound effects on patient care. Such deci-
sions require careful ethical analysis as well as the 
customary focus on effi ciency and cost effectiveness. 
The challenge is to identify societal values underpin-
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ning cries for cost controls and to promote ethical 
refl ection on those values. ■
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3sorting through this type of complex situation, skills 
that cannot be learned solely in the classroom.
In the late 1990s, a task force of The Society for 
Health and Human Values and Society for Bioethics 
Consultation issued a report on the core competen-
cies, that is to say the skills, knowledge, and char-
acter traits, required for ethics consultation (Aulisio, 
Arnold, & Youngner, 2000). It is suggested in the 
report that to “perform competently” (Aulisio et al., 
2000, p. 61), consultants should possess: knowledge 
in nine different areas (e.g., knowledge of ethical 
theory and concepts, knowledge of the health care 
system, etc.); virtues such as compassion, courage, 
honesty, and integrity; and ethical assessment skills, 
process skills, and interpersonal skills. The authors 
of the report acknowledge that certain skills, par-
ticularly process skills (e.g., the skills of facilitating 
meetings, eliciting people’s moral viewpoints, re-
solving confl ict, and building moral consensus), are 
best taught using “ ‘hands-on’ approaches” (Aulisio 
et al., 2000, p. 64). That is exactly what the ethics 
residency at RAH provides the resident – a hands-on 
approach to learning about ethics consultations.
I am grateful for the opportunities this residency has 
offered me to develop skills in ethics consultation.  
At this point in time, Edmonton is one of very few 
cities in Canada where programs of this nature are 
in place. The wisdom and foresight of the program’s 
founders and sponsors are acknowledged. It is my 
hope that similar programs may emerge in other 
teaching hospitals in Canada in the near future. ■
References
Aulisio, M., Arnold, R., and Youngner, S.  (2000).  Health care ethics 
consultation:  Nature, goals, and competencies.  Annals of Internal 
Medicine, 133(1), 59-69.
Benner, P.  (1984).  From novice to expert.  Excellence and power in 
clinical nursing practice.  Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley.
Polanyi, M.  (1962).  Personal knowledge:  Towards a post-critical 
philosophy.  New York: Harper and Row.
4Research studies show that while an increasing 
number of parents of children conceived as a result 
of donor conception procedures appear to be telling 
- or planning to tell - their child about their con-
ception (see Golombok et al., 2004; Brewaeys et al., 
2005 for an overview), a large proportion of parents 
choose not to do so. Since the overwhelming major-
ity of parents normally support truth-telling within 
their families, the decision to conceal the nature of 
the child’s conception - and deception to maintain 
its concealment - requires explanation. 
Factors that appear to infl uence parents’ decisions 
include pragmatic reasons and the desire to protect 
the child, the parents and family relationships:
1. they are often advised by clinics not to tell;
2.  in the case of donor insemination, disclosure re-
veals the father’s potentially stigmatizing fertil-
ity diffi culties;
3.  disclosure may alienate the child and damage 
family relationships between the child and the 
non-genetically related parent, between the par-
ents and between the family and the extended 
family;
4. disclosure may damage the child’s self-image;
5.  limited information about the donor means that 
parents are unable to answer any questions the 
child may have;
6. parents do not know how to tell their child;
7.  if this information is disclosed to others, they may 
stigmatize the child and/or the whole family.
There is limited evidence that any of these fears are 
realized in practice. Indeed, the experience of many 
parents who have told their children is the converse, 
that telling strengthens family bonds. We believe 
that families are best served by children being told 
about their origins at a very early age. Keeping a 
secret such as this can itself become an unnecessary 
burden that may undermine family relationships 
– especially if the secret is divulged accidentally or 
inadvertently. Lack of information about the donor 
certainly doesn’t mean that children shouldn’t be 
told anything. Donor-conceived children are clear 
about what they think they should be told, as evi-
denced by this nine-year old (personal communica-
tion):  
“If you do not tell, you will no longer hold or gain 
your child’s trust. However if you do tell, there is 
nothing to be afraid of. You are doing the right 
thing. In fact, I can’t remember a time when I didn’t 
know. Do not be afraid. You can’t keep things a 
secret forever and if/when your child fi nds out they 
will want to know if you are hiding anything else." 
One of the strongest reasons for telling is to ensure 
that the donor-conceived person has accurate infor-
mation about his or her health history. If they are 
never told about their donor conception, they will 
incorrectly assume their family health history is ac-
curate. Of course, this also means that information 
about donors and their health history needs to be 
more comprehensive than is often currently provided 
by fertility clinics and sperm banks. They need to re-
spond to this challenge for the benefi t of the families 
they are helping to create. ■      
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5Antonio, 12 years old, sits uncomfortably in the 
walk-in clinic’s examining room with a bloody 
washcloth in his hand. With tear-stained cheeks, he 
whimpers softly while his mother gently rubs his 
back. Dr. Tollefson, a family physician, enters, clip-
board in hand. “Hi, I’m Dr. Tollefson. You’re……Mrs. 
Bracco? And you’re Antonio?” “Hello, Doctor,” 
replies Mrs. B. Antonio nods shyly. “That’s quite the 
split lip you have. Skateboarding, was it?” “Yes, he 
was trying to jump over something he had never 
tried before. He loves his skateboarding. But when 
I saw how big the cut was, I brought him here right 
away.” “That’s good. Antonio, did you hurt any of 
your teeth? Or maybe your tongue or inside your 
mouth” “I don’t think so…” he replies, waveringly.  
“Well, why don’t you open your mouth for me so I 
can get a good look inside?”
Visual examination shows no damage to his teeth, 
tongue or oral tissue. “Right, your teeth are fi ne. So 
is your tongue and cheek. That’s really, really good.  
It’s just your lip that’s hurt. Now….” “So you’ll stitch 
it up?” asks his mother. “Yes, I could stitch it up; it’d 
take two, maybe three, little stitches. Or we could 
just leave it alone because it’s already closed pretty 
nicely by itself.” “Well, if that’s all that’s needed, go 
ahead and stitch up his lip.” (Names are fi ctitious). 
The lawyer: In Alberta, no age is specifi ed in pro-
vincial legislation regarding when a healthcare 
practitioner must obtain consent to recommended 
treatment from a minor (i.e., someone under age 18) 
versus from his or her guardian (i.e., usually a par-
ent). As a result, we look to the common law (that 
body of law created by the courts). In this case, it has 
developed the “mature minor” doctrine or principle. 
If a minor understands the nature of the treatment 
being proposed and the consequences of proceeding 
with, or refusing, that treatment, he or she is consid-
ered to be a mature minor with the capacity to agree 
to or refuse the treatment (Picard and Robertson, 
1996). A practitioner providing services to a mature 
minor must look to that minor for consent and not 
to their guardian. If the patient does not qualify as a 
mature minor, then the guardian’s consent must be 
sought.2 
How does a practitioner decide if a minor has ca-
pacity to consent to treatment or refuse treatment?3  
From a legal perspective, the assessment is a func-
tional one which must be made on a case by case 
basis. The ability to consent to treatment or refuse 
treatment depends on the particular minor’s maturity 
relative to addressing the specifi c medical problem. 
The practitioner does not assess capacity to make all 
decisions, but only the ability to decide with respect 
to the treatment in question. The practitioner must 
determine whether the minor is able to understand 
what treatment and non-treatment entails, predicted 
benefi ts and risks, and the consequences that may 
affect his or her body, among other things. Factors 
to consider include the minor’s age, seriousness of 
the medical condition (e.g., sprained fi nger or heart 
surgery), nature of the treatment, and ability to com-
prehend information that is relevant for making an 
informed decision.  
While in most cases, a mature minor can consent 
or not to treatment decisions, the Child, Youth and 
Family Enhancement Act of Alberta (2000) can 
trump the above consent process. Under the Act, 
anyone “who has reasonable and probable grounds 
to believe that a child is in need of intervention” 
(s. 4) is legally obligated to report this to a director.  
If the treatment is essential for the minor and the 
minor or the guardian refuses it, a practitioner must 
report this (Child, Youth and Family Enhancement 
Act of Alberta, 2000, s. 2.1(b)). If a court deems the 
treatment essential and in the specifi c minor’s best 
interests (as per several factors set out in the Act, 
s. 2), a judge may order treatment (s. 22.2).4 An 
example of this occurred in the case of  H.(B.) v. 
Alberta (Director of Child Welfare, 2002)5 in which 
a 16-year old Jehovah’s Witness with acute myeloid 
leukemia who was found to have capacity at the 
Court of Queen’s Bench level refused chemotherapy 
accompanied by blood transfusions. The court stated 
that it was bound to make the decision that was in 
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6her best interests, and her wishes were but one factor 
it was required to consider in reaching its decision.
The ethicist: Parental duties are not limited to their 
child’s physical well-being, safety, education, and 
happiness. Parents also are responsible for develop-
ing the child’s life skills and character. Included in 
important life skills is sound decision-making just as 
being responsible (acting in ways that demonstrate 
a holistic concern for others as well as oneself) and 
accountable (being answerable to other people and to 
oneself) are important character traits. Since health 
has an indisputably immense impact on one’s life, it 
should be a primary area in which children and ado-
lescents practice sound decision-making and develop 
personal responsibility and accountability.  
When caring for children/adolescents, a pediatri-
cian or other health practitioners’ fi rst duty is to the 
individual patient. However recognizing a child is not 
only an individual but also a member of a family, 
pediatric practices and facilities customarily balance 
their duties to children with the role and needs of 
the family. Accordingly, practitioners honour their 
primary duty to the child by assisting parents in 
discharging their parental duties. Our society allows 
parents considerable latitude in raising their children. 
One justifi cation for this latitude is the societal belief 
that parents, prima facie, are committed to and care 
about the child more than anyone else. A second, 
often unmentioned, reason is the societal belief that 
being a parent is itself a highly valued experience.6  
Legal-ethical recommendations for practitioners: 
Dr. Tollefson needs to decide if Antonio suffi ciently 
understands the nature of a split lip and the conse-
quences of having versus not having sutures. If he 
concludes Antonio is a mature minor, then Antonio 
7should choose. Antonio probably does understand 
the nature of his injury: he can see it and he’s likely 
had some “respectable” cuts as part of a healthy 
childhood of play and exploration. He should be able 
to understand Dr. T’s explanation of having versus 
not having sutures if the doctor avoids medical-ese. 
The predictable risks of either option are very minor, 
assuming that Antonio has no complicating morbidi-
ties (e.g., hematological or immunological condi-
tions). Moreover, Antonio has calmed down and is 
not in signifi cant pain (fear or pain can be obstacles 
to sound decision-making for anyone).
But when taking his mother into account, Dr. T 
concedes that he has no prior experience with her in 
terms of her parenting approach. Past practitioners 
may have never involved the boy in his health-re-
lated decisions and so he and his mother could be 
surprised if Dr. T. bluntly said “Well, it’s all up to 
Antonio.” Surprises are undesirable in healthcare be-
cause they can erode trust in practitioners. Working 
from the idea that practitioners should help parents 
“grow” their children’s abilities to make choices as 
well as be responsible and accountable, Dr. T. could 
say to Mrs. B, “I like these kinds of situations be-
cause parents and I get to work together on what the 
child wants done and what he learns from making 
such choices. Antonio’s injury is luckily simple and 
I bet he’ll understand when I explain to him about 
having stitches versus not having them. You’ve 
settled him down a lot already and he isn’t having 
much pain anymore. So this seems to be a good op-
portunity to see what he wants done to his lip….”
Dr. T’s statements to Mrs. B are neither confronta-
tional nor condescending. Instead he adopts a col-
laborative approach, acknowledging the care Mrs. B. 
has already given her son. Using ordinary language, 
he has identifi ed basic components of informed con-
sent and patient autonomy: proportional level of un-
derstanding, no internal coercion (i.e., pain or fear), 
and the person’s prima facie authority over the bur-
dens that are endured and benefi ts that are sought. 
Furthermore since this is Dr. T’s fi rst visit with Mrs. 
B, a collaborative approach provides “room” in the 
discussion for her to identify cultural values that 
may impact how the treatment/non-treatment deci-
sion is fi nally made.    
But what if Antonio is 8 years old and the condi-
tion is a life-impacting ailment and/or the standard 
treatment recommended by Dr. Tollefson is not 
simple? From a legal perspective, his parents would 
most likely be the appropriate persons to look to for 
consent. An ethical perspective would recommend 
that Antonio still be involved in appropriate discus-
sions wherein the guiding goal is that he won’t be 
surprised or afraid by what will happen, he is able to 
have some personal input to the therapy plan (maybe 
to be hospitalized in a room with other children 
rather than alone), and that he has opportunities to 
get answers to his questions or worries.
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Notes
1.  This information is not in any way intended to be legal advice and 
should not be relied on for such a purpose. If you have any doubt 
or questions about assessing capacity, or any other matters that 
potentially involve your obligations and the rights of minors and 
guardians, consult with your colleagues and, where appropriate, seek 
legal advice.  
2.  In either instance, consent must be informed and referable (proper 
disclosure must be made), and provided voluntarily.
3.  For guidelines on the assessment of capacity, see College of Physi-
cians and Surgeons of Alberta Guideline.  (2002).  Competency 




4. Where the child is subject to a guardianship order.
5.  See also  [2002].  A.J. No 568 (Alta C.A.) though it appears that the 
Court of Appeal misapprehended some of the fi ndings of Justice Kent 
of the Court of Queen’s Bench.  
6.  A helpful overview regarding practitioners’ responsibilities for and to 
children and parents is Harrison et al.  (1997).  Bioethics for Clini-
cians: 9. Involving children in medical decisions. Canadian Medical 
Association Journal, 156(6), 825-828.
8When people working in health ethics discuss re-
source allocation, they are often thinking of cases in 
which a surgeon must choose between two candi-
dates for a transplant, with different medical histo-
ries and prognoses, when only one donor organ is 
available. Or, they may be thinking about a situation 
in which an emergency room physician knows that 
an accident victim with serious brain injuries belongs 
in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU), but also knows that 
no beds are available, so the patient cannot be sent 
to ICU without shifting someone else to a less satis-
factory setting (McKneally et al., 1997).
For purposes of policy analysis, these situations are 
quite different. The scarcity of suitable organs for 
transplantation is a ‘natural’ scarcity, given the cur-
rent state of medical science and technology. (In the 
future, the ability to grow organs for transplantation 
in vitro may raise quite a different set of resource 
allocation issues.) On the other hand, the shortage of 
ICU beds exemplifi es a more common set of circum-
stances, described by Calabresi and Bobbitt (1978, 
p. 22) in their remarkable book on Tragic Choices: 
“Scarcity is not the result of any absolute lack of a 
resource but rather of the decision by society that it 
is not prepared to forgo other goods and benefi ts in 
a number suffi cient to remove the scarcity.”
Press reports suggest that such decisions have led 
(for instance) to preventable deaths from emergency 
care delays in Saskatoon, and to refusals of demon-
strably effective pain relief for patients in Toronto 
(Haight, 2004; Papp, 2003). Media fi le clippings 
provide an imperfect basis for informed discussion 
about resource allocation, yet even as Canada spends 
more than $84 billion in public funds annually on 
health care, solid descriptive research on how priori-
ties are actually set at the institutional, regional and 
provincial level is extremely scarce.  
It is therefore time to abandon deference to choices 
made by political elites and senior managers within 
the health care system. To quote Calabresi and Bob-
bitt (1978, p. 150-151) again: “We must determine 
where – if at all – in the history of a society’s ap-
proach to the particular scarce resource a decision 
substantially within the control of that society was 
made as a result of which the resource was permit-
Interrogating Scarcity: The Challenge for Health Ethics 
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9ted to remain scarce. …. Scarcity cannot simply be 
assumed as a given.” 
So when (for example) there are not enough ICU 
beds or there is not enough money for palliative 
care, it is important to ask why not, and to chal-
lenge decisions that have generated or worsened 
scarcity. The Registered Nurses Association of 
Ontario provided a fi ne example in 2004, when 
they urged the newly elected Ontario government 
to: “Stop the tax-cut tail from wagging the [health 
care] rebuilding dog.”  
Ritual invocations of resource scarcity are even more 
frequent, and less persuasive, in the global frame of 
reference. We’re solemnly told by political leaders 
like Prime Minister Martin that modest increases in 
development assistance for health-related programs, 
which could save literally millions of lives per year 
(UN Millennium Project, 2005) are unaffordable, 
although the price for the G7 industrialized coun-
tries would be equivalent to the value of 0.6-1.5 Big 
Macs per person, per week (Labonte, Schrecker & Sen 
Gupta, 2005) … and the costs involved for Canada 
and the United States are dwarfed by the value of 
recent tax cuts.   
The argument that health care ethics must engage 
directly with broader social choices about resource 
allocation is not new. Barry Hoffmaster pointed out 
in 1992 that examination of nontreatment decisions 
within neonatal ICUs must be combined with ques-
tions about social conditions (determinants of health) 
that contribute to the need for such units. What’s 
new is the urgency of that engagement, at a time of 
relentless domestic pressure to scale back publicly 
fi nanced social provision and a parallel international 
retreat from acceptance of obligations across borders. 
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Seeing the title, it’s likely that the author will be 
presumed to be someone working in palliative care 
or chaplaincy and thus discounted by medical re-
searchers and physicians. However, Groopman is a 
hematologist-oncologist, the Chair of Medicine at 
Harvard Medical School and the Chief of Experimen-
tal Medicine at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center. 
He’s co-authored approximately 200 clinical articles, 
authored two books about practice, and contributes 
regularly to The New Yorker magazine (see www.
jeromegroopman.com). Groopman disputes modern 
healthcare’s understanding of hope as being a con-
cern only for pastoral care, a comforting platitude, or 
so idiosyncratic that a practitioner cannot bear any 
responsibility for it. Instead The Anatomy of Hope’s 
raison d’etre is to persuade practitioners that preserv-
ing hope may be as clinically desirable and attain-
able as increasing oxygen saturation rates, decreas-
ing white cell counts, and maintaining fl uid balance.
The Anatomy of Hope has two sections: the fi rst 
section presents anecdotal evidence about hope’s 
clinical effi cacy while the second section presents 
empirical evidence. Early in the book, Groopman 
admits that he “mistook information for insight” dur-
ing medical school at Columbia University (pp. 23).  
Now much wiser, he carefully examines a few telling 
patient cases, demonstrating what is often known in 
philosophical circles as the “ethics of attention”. As 
is typical for how most of us learn or become open 
to new ways of thinking, the case of “someone like 
me” (i.e., a colleague who is diagnosed with a virtu-
ally-untreatable cancer) and the case of “me” (i.e., 
Groopman’s own intractable back problems) provide 
particularly powerful insights for him. The result is 
gripping stories that have led the author to conclude 
that hope legitimately qualifi es as a clinical concern.  
The fi nal two chapters present emerging clinical re-
search evidence that hope has a signifi cant connec-
tion with physiological recovery. The physiological 
effect comes from the relationship of endorphins and 
enkephalins to our emotional and cognitive states.  
These two chapters try to convince clinicians that 
hope warrants as much empirical investigation as do 
pharmaceutical or surgical options. 
I recommend this book for three reasons. First, its 
topic is an avenue of therapy which a seasoned clini-
cian believes is very promising. Second, practitio-
ners should be comforted by Groopman’s courage to 
admit that, despite years of experience and many ac-
complishments, some patients continue to haunt him. 
To his credit, he has let them teach him. And last, 
I found The Anatomy of Hope to be a particularly 
moving account of the competing, often confl icting, 
expectations of being a doctor.     
Barbara Russell, PhD, MBA 
Assistant Clinical Professor, John Dossetor Health Ethics 
Centre, University of Alberta
Book Review
The Anatomy of Hope: How People Prevail in the Face of Illness
Author: Jerome Groopman, MD
Publisher: New York: Random House, 2004
ISBN 0375506381 (also available in audio)
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Upcoming Events
Dossetor Centre Health Ethics Seminars:
Please check the John Dossetor Health Ethics Centre website at www.ualberta.ca/BIOETHICS/ for an 
updated seminar schedule.
Bioethics Week 2006: 
Theme: Organizational Ethics
Bioethics Week will take place from 6 – 12 March 2006. 
UAH/SCH Clinical Ethics Committee:
Grand Rounds 
For the 2006 schedule, please check the John Dossetor Health Ethics Centre website at 
www.ualberta.ca/BIOETHICS/.
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